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INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, media attention focused on sexual harassment as victims 
reported harassment and assault as part of the #MeToo movement.  Although 
many of the accounts focused on sexualized treatment, this treatment often 
occurred within a broader context of unequal treatment, such as pay 
inequality and the disproportionately low promotion rate of women into 
leadership positions.  For decades, legal scholars have noted the interplay 
between broader work constructs and harassment.1 
                                               
 * Judge Joseph P. Kinneary Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
 1. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1993) 
[hereinafter Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment]; see also Martha 
Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some 
Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment 
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003) [hereinafter Green, “Workplace Dynamics”]; 
Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623 (2005); Joanna L. 
Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking Back: A Retrospective on Sexual Harassment Law, 95 
B.U. L. REV. 1029 (2015); Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from 
Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2018); Susan 
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 458 (2001). 
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When combined, stories and scholarship offer a powerful critique of 
the way many judges and practitioners currently conceive of harassment: as 
a separate, stand-alone “claim” under Title VII.  When the Supreme Court 
first recognized harassment in the mid-1980s, it created frameworks for 
harassment cases that seemed to separate harassment from other types of 
disparate treatment.  It also tended to separate various categories of 
harassment, labeling harassment with words such as “quid pro quo” or 
“hostile work environment.”2  Hostile-work-environment cases often focus 
on whether the alleged conduct was unwelcome, whether it was “severe or 
pervasive,” and whether it objectively and subjectively altered the work 
environment of the plaintiff.3 
In contrast, when a plaintiff files other types of disparate-treatment 
cases, the courts use different analytical frameworks.  For example, if a 
plaintiff alleges single-motive disparate treatment based on circumstantial 
evidence, courts usually analyze the case under the three-part, burden-
shifting framework developed in McDonnell Douglas v. Green.4 
This Article argues that viewing harassment as a separate, stand-
alone claim likely misinterprets Title VII and the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence surrounding harassment.  Unfortunately, this error represents 
the dominant view among federal appellate and district courts and has 
profound consequences for the reach of harassment law. 
This Article argues that harassment is not, and never was, intended 
to be a separate claim under Title VII.5  It does so by showing that the history 
of discrimination law is plagued with procedural ambiguity.  The Supreme 
Court has regularly used civil-procedure words like “proof,” “burden,” and 
“claim” inartfully.6 This inexact use has resulted in decades of confusion.7  
                                               
 2. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998). 
 3. See, e.g., Fuller v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 865 F.3d 1154, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 4. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015); Tex. 
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981). 
 5. This Article focuses on sexual harassment and thus Title VII. However, the 
arguments made in this Article would also apply in other contexts, such as the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
 6. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 339 (2013) (“Title 
VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for 
causation. . . . “) (emphasis added); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009) 
(quoting Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005)) (“Where the statutory text is ‘silent on 
the allocation of the burden of persuasion,’ we ‘begin with the ordinary default rule that 
plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.’”) (emphasis added); cf. Richard J. 
Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L. REV. 540, 564 (2014) 
(exposing the commonality of “errors involv[ing] precision in word choice” in Supreme Court 
opinions based partly on “sharply contrasting views on the proper definition of some words 
and even their existence”). 
 7. See, e.g., Green, Workplace Dynamics, supra note 1, at 151 (discussing “confusion 
surrounding claims alleging system-wide discriminatory bias operating through decentralized, 
highly subjective decisionmaking processes”); Grossman, supra note 1, at 1035 (discussing 
how “[t]he Meritor Court . . . cemented confusion over the proper standard for employer 
liability”); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 120 
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In several instances, the Supreme Court has stepped in to clear up the 
procedural confusion.8  When doing so, it often interprets federal 
discrimination law in ways that are procedurally distinct from the dominant 
paradigm existing at the time.  This Article provides an overview of a number 
of instances in which the Supreme Court has done this.  Harassment law is 
equally due for the same procedural clarification.  Consistent with current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, courts can and should clarify that harassment 
is not a stand-alone claim. 
This jurisprudential transition would have profound procedural, 
substantive, and theoretical implications.  It affects what a plaintiff must 
plead to survive a motion to dismiss.  In addition, it affects whether a judge 
can issue jury instructions related to harassment if a plaintiff does not directly 
allege harassment in a complaint.  On the substantive and theoretical levels, 
it affects how courts and litigants view harassment’s connection to other 
types of facts supporting discrimination.  Viewing harassment as a Title VII 
claim, rather than a stand-alone harassment claim, also affects whether and 
how courts will apply 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(2) to harassment facts. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Section I describes Title VII’s 
statutory language and the main Supreme Court cases addressing harassment 
law.  This section focuses on the way the Supreme Court uses words like 
“claim” and “theory” to describe harassment and shows how these words 
could cause courts and litigants to be confused about what harassment 
doctrine is. Section II discusses the procedural, substantive, and theoretical 
consequences that stem from perceiving harassment as a separate claim under 
Title VII.  In Section III, this Article examines other instances in which the 
Supreme Court has issued decisions that are procedurally ambiguous.  As a 
direct result, the lower courts and litigants then developed a dominant 
understanding about the procedural implications of the ambiguity.  In later 
cases, the Supreme Court has returned to these earlier cases and interpreted 
them in ways that often contest the dominant procedural paradigm.  Section 
IV explores how this same shift can and should occur in harassment law. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Title VII is the cornerstone federal employment discrimination 
statute. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against a worker 
on the basis of race, sex, national origin, color, or religion.9  Title VII’s main 
operative provision consists of two subparts.  Under the first subpart, it is an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to do the following: 
                                               
(2011) (“Even assuming that some confusion would be generated by a lack of guidance, the 
Supreme Court’s frameworks have generated quite a few problems on their own.”). 
 8. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 355; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 509–10 
(2002). 
 9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2012). 
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin[.]10  
Under Title VII’s second subpart, it is unlawful for an employer to 
do the following: 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.11 
These two subparts form the foundation of Title VII’s text.12  The 
field of employment discrimination is laden with proof structures.  The 
federal courts have developed an elaborate system of analytical frameworks 
through which courts evaluate cases alleging employment discrimination.13 
The Supreme Court first recognized that plaintiffs can prevail under 
Title VII if they face harassment (or a hostile work environment) in Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson.14  In Meritor, the Supreme Court started its analysis 
by quoting the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).15  This reference is 
important for two reasons.  First, it means that the Court derived the statutory 
authority for harassment from the main operative provision of Title VII.  
Harassment is not a different claim, separately stated within Title VII.  
Rather, it is part of the same provision from which most of the other theories 
of discrimination derive. 
Second, as discussed in more detail below, it means that the courts 
have not fully articulated the possible scope of harassment.  Title VII’s main 
operative provision has two subparts, and the Supreme Court has yet to 
consider how harassment would proceed under the second subpart. 
                                               
 10. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 11. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 12. As stated earlier, Congress amended Title VII in 1991. However, this does not 
change the fact that the foundational text of Title VII is contained in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2(a) (West 2012). 
 13. See generally Sperino, supra note 7. Fully describing each framework is not 
necessary for this Article. However, by way of example, the courts have developed different 
frameworks to analyze cases involving direct evidence, circumstantial evidence of single-
motive disparate treatment, circumstantial evidence of mixed-motive under Title VII, pattern 
or practice, and disparate impact. 
 14. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
 15. Id. at 63. 
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In Meritor, the Supreme Court discussed whether the words “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment” encompass sexual harassment.16  
The Court stated, “[t]he phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum 
of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment.”17  The Court 
continued, “we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII 
by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive 
work environment.”18  The Court then stated that harassment affects the 
“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” when it is “sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.”19 
The textual focus of Meritor is on the words “terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment.”  Importantly, the Supreme Court did not purport 
to fully define these words.20  Rather, the Supreme Court defined one set of 
circumstances under which those terms would be fulfilled.21  In other words, 
a severe or pervasive “hostile work environment” is one way for a plaintiff 
to establish that she faced discrimination in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of her employment because of a protected trait.22 
In Meritor, the Supreme Court did not clearly articulate what it was 
creating in a procedural sense.  Several parts of the opinion demonstrate that 
the Court was not recognizing a new separate cause of action.  For example, 
the Court cited to the main language of Title VII.23  The case focused on 
defining whether harassment could be a type of harm that fell within the 
language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).24  The Supreme Court also used the 
word “theory” to describe “hostile work environment.”25  Unfortunately, it 
also used the word “claim” to describe “hostile work environment.”26 
It is vitally important to know what the Court created in Meritor.  If 
the Supreme Court created a separate “claim” called harassment (or “hostile 
work environment”), then Meritor should be read as starting a conversation 
about the “elements” of that separate claim.  As such, a plaintiff would be 
required to prove the elements of this claim to prevail on a harassment claim. 
However, a better reading is that Meritor recognized a subset of harm 
within the contours of Title VII.  Although the differences between these two 
descriptions may seem to be mere semantics, Section II demonstrates how 
                                               
 16. Id. at 64. 
 17. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 18. Id. at 66. 
 19. Id. at 67 (citation omitted). 
 20. See id. at 63, 65, 70, 72 (discussing the definitions of “sexual harassment” and 
“employer,” but not “terms, conditions, or privileges”). 
 21. See id. at 64 (“unwelcome sexual advances that create an offensive or hostile work 
environment”). 
 22. Id. at 67. 
 23. Id. at 63. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 68, 71. 
 26. Id. at 59, 62, 67, 68, 73. 
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the choice among these alternatives creates radical differences in the way we 
conceive of harassment. 
The Supreme Court did not clarify the ambiguity in its next 
harassment case, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.27  Notably, in Harris, the 
Court did not use the word “claim” to describe harassment as a separate cause 
of action. The Court noted: 
When the workplace is permeated with “discriminatory 
intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” . . . that is “sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 
employment and create an abusive working environment,”. . 
. Title VII is violated.28 
The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging harassment need not 
allege psychological injury but would be required to establish that she 
subjectively believed the environment to be hostile or abusive and that the 
environment would be so viewed by an objective person.29  In making this 
latter inquiry, the Court noted: 
But we can say that whether an environment is “hostile” or 
“abusive” can be determined only by looking at all the 
circumstances. These may include the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; 
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s 
work performance.30 
The Court also indicated that the harassing conduct must be unwelcome.31 
Just like in Meritor, Harris does not focus on setting up a distinct 
cause of action or claim under Title VII.  Rather, Harris further clarified 
                                               
 27. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
 28. Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (internal brackets 
and quotation marks omitted)). 
 29. Id. at 21–22. 
 30. Id. at 23. Although there are some variations, courts tend to articulate harassment as 
requiring proof that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that she was subjected to 
unwelcome sexual harassment, that the harassment was based on sex, and that it affected a 
term, condition, or privilege of employment. Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 
F.3d 787, 801 (8th Cir. 2009). When determining whether harassment affected a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment, courts look at both objective and subjective 
components, requiring the harassment to be “severe or pervasive enough to create an 
objectively hostile or abusive work environment,” as well as requiring the victim to 
subjectively perceive the working conditions to be so altered. Id. 
 31. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22 (“Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive 
the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the 
victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII violation.”). 
2019] HARASSMENT:  A SEPARATE CLAIM? 127 
when the harm alleged in a sexual harassment case will be sufficient to meet 
the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” language of Title VII. 
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services., Inc.,32 the Supreme 
Court considered whether same-sex sexual harassment could be 
discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII.  As with Meritor, the 
Supreme Court began its substantive discussion by citing to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e–2(a)(1).33  This time, the court focused on what it means to 
discriminate against an individual “because of sex.”34  The Court held that a 
man can indeed discriminate against another man because of his sex.35 
Without explaining the procedural implications, the Supreme Court 
used the word “claim” multiple times to describe same-sex sexual 
harassment.  The Court noted: 
Some, like the Fifth Circuit in this case, have held that same-
sex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under 
Title VII. . . . Other decisions say that such claims are 
actionable only if the plaintiff can prove that the harasser is 
homosexual (and thus presumably motivated by sexual 
desire). . . . We see no justification in the statutory language 
or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex 
harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII.36 
At the same time, the Court made clear that same-sex sexual 
harassment fell under the general umbrella of discrimination provided for in 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).37 
Other major Supreme Court cases discussing harassment deal with 
circumstances when an employer will be held liable for such harassment.38  
                                               
 32. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78–79 (1998). 
 33. Id. at 78. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 79. 
 36. Id. (citing Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (internal 
citation omitted)). 
 37. Id. at 82. 
 38. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746–47 (1998); Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton,, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). In these cases, the Supreme Court created a multi-
step process for determining when an employer will be held liable for harassment. An 
employer will be liable for a supervisor’s harassment if it results in a tangible employment 
action. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. The Court defined a tangible employment action as “a 
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant 
change in benefits.” Id. at 761. If a supervisor engages in harassment that does not result in a 
tangible employment action, the employer will be liable for the harassment unless the 
employer can establish an affirmative defense. As articulated by the Court, the affirmative 
defense has two elements: “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided 
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Id. at 765. 
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These cases reiterate that harassment (or “hostile work environment”) falls 
within the larger ambit of a Title VII violation.  For example, in Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, the Court considered whether an employer is liable for 
“sexual harassment of subordinates [that] ha[ve] created a hostile work 
environment amounting to employment discrimination.”39  Simply put, 
harassment is one subset of discrimination harm.  In Faragher, the Court 
referred to the plaintiff’s claim as a “Title VII claim”40 and noted that its prior 
cases discussed the “substantive contours of the hostile environments 
forbidden by Title VII.”41 
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Court quoted 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e–2(a)(1) and noted that the text of Title VII does not contain the 
words “hostile work environment.”42  Ellerth described Meritor as follows: 
“There we considered whether the conduct in question constituted 
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title 
VII.”43 The Court continued: 
We assumed, and with adequate reason, that if an employer 
demanded sexual favors from an employee in return for a job 
benefit, discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of 
employment was explicit. Less obvious was whether an 
employer’s sexually demeaning behavior altered terms or 
conditions of employment in violation of Title VII. We 
distinguished between quid pro quo claims and hostile 
environment claims, see [Meritor], and said both were 
cognizable under Title VII, though the latter requires 
harassment that is severe or pervasive.44 
This part of Ellerth is important because the Court appears to 
understand Meritor as recognizing at least two different fact patterns that will 
establish harassment liability under Title VII: “quid pro quo” and “hostile 
environment.”45 This would suggest that there are at least two, if not more, 
evidentiary paths to establishing what the Court called harassment.  
However, in Faragher and Ellerth, the Court once again used the word 
“claim” when referring to harassment.  For example, in Faragher, the Court 
noted that “environmental claims are covered by the statute.”46 
By looking at the Supreme Court harassment jurisprudence in its 
totality, and with an eye toward procedure, a few themes emerge.  It is 
certainly correct that the Supreme Court has used the word “claim” to 
                                               
 39. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. 
 40. Id. at 780, 784. 
 41. Id. at 788. 
 42. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 752–54. 
 46. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786. 
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describe harassment.  However, in doing so, it has not proclaimed or 
described any particular procedural importance to the use of this word.  The 
cases also show that the Court has repeatedly noted that harassment is a 
subset of harm recognized under the language of “terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment.”  There are also at least two kinds of harassment: 
“quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment.”  This means that there are 
at least two paths to establish harassment, so that harassment is, at the very 
least, not one claim with one set of elements. 
The Supreme Court’s harassment cases to date are ones textually 
supported under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).  This is important for two 
reasons.  First, harassment jurisprudence derives from and is part of Title 
VII’s main operative provision.  It is not a stand-alone claim set forth in a 
separate statutory provision.  Second, the Supreme Court has not considered 
what harassment theory might look like under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(2). 
II. HARASSMENT CLAIMS VERSUS TITLE VII CLAIMS 
Thinking about harassment as a separate claim with elements, rather 
than as one way to prove a violation of Title VII, has a number of 
consequences.  Overwhelmingly, courts and scholars use language that 
perceives harassment as a separate claim.47  In the interest of full disclosure, 
I have also used this language in articles, although I am trying to be more 
careful about using the word “claim.”  Here are some important implications 
that follow from this framing choice, ranging from the procedural to the 
theoretical. 
A. Procedural Issues 
If harassment is a separate, stand-alone claim from other kinds of 
discrimination, this directly impacts what a plaintiff must plead in the 
complaint.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the plaintiff to state 
the claim and provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.”48  Recent Supreme Court cases re-interpret 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to require the plaintiff to plead facts 
sufficient to plausibly support the claim in the complaint.49  A judge may 
                                               
 47. See, e.g., Deters v. Rock-Tenn Co., 245 F. App’x 516, 521 (6th Cir. 2007); Mendoza 
v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1242, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999); EEOC. v. G.F.B. Enters., LLC., 
No. 01-4035-CIV-SEITZ, 2002 WL 1908496, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2002). See also Dallan 
F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased Customer Feedback into 
Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2215 (2018); Laura T. Kessler, Employm
ent Discrimination and the Domino Effect, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1066 (2017). 
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 49. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007). 
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properly dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), if the plaintiff fails to meet the pleading requirement.50 
Thinking of harassment as a separate, stand-alone claim means that 
a plaintiff must use words that suggest harassment and plead facts supporting 
harassment, even if the plaintiff’s complaint otherwise properly pleads other 
types of discrimination.  A court could dismiss the plaintiff’s harassment 
“claim” in such a circumstance, even while allowing other “claims” of 
discrimination to proceed.  Consistent with this view of harassment as a 
separate “claim,” courts often dismiss complaints alleging harassment if the 
plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to support the “elements” of a 
harassment “claim.”51 
Likewise, if harassment is a separate claim, it would be appropriate 
for a judge to refuse to consider such a claim at the summary judgment stage 
or refuse to give jury instructions on such a claim, should the plaintiff not 
plead the claim of harassment in her complaint.52  Some courts have 
articulated harassment in such a way.53 
Thinking of harassment as a stand-alone claim also has repercussions 
related to administrative exhaustion. Prior to filing a Title VII claim in court, 
a plaintiff must file a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or a comparable state 
agency.54  If the plaintiff does not inform the EEOC of a claim, the plaintiff 
may not later raise that claim in court unless the allegations are reasonably 
related to the original charge.55  Courts have dismissed plaintiffs’ harassment 
claims when plaintiffs submit sex-discrimination facts to the EEOC that do 
not specifically mention acts of harassment.56  In these instances, the courts 
seem to view harassment as a separate claim from other claims of 
discrimination. 
In contrast, if harassment is really a Title VII claim, then the plaintiff 
should be able to proceed with a harassment claim even if her Charge does 
                                               
 50. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 51. See, e.g., Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1061 (8th Cir. 2016); Edwards v. Prime, 
Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1300 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 52. For examples of this phenomenon in another context, see Ginger v. District of 
Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 
F.3d 100, 105 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005) (refusing to consider a motivating factor test on appeal); 
EEOC v. Aldi, Inc., No. 06–01210, 2009 WL 3183077, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 53. See, e.g., Mason v. S. Ill. Univ. at Carbondale, 233 F.3d 1036, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(refusing to instruct jury on “claim” of co-worker harassment where plaintiff only asserted 
“claim” of harassment by a supervisor). 
 54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (West 2012). 
 55. Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962–63 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 963; see also Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 503 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (“[O]rdinarily, a claim of sexual harassment cannot be reasonably inferred from 
allegations in an EEOC charge of sexual discrimination.”); Callahan v. Univ. of Cent. Mo., 
No. 12-0281-CV-W-HFS, 2013 WL 796560, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2013) (dismissing age 
harassment claims even though plaintiff specifically mentioned that the terms of her 
employment were altered); Alston v. U-Haul Co. of Kan., No. 06-2403-CM, 2007 WL 
1412672, at *2 (D. Kan. May 10, 2007). 
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not separately delineate harassment.  For example, the EEOC has a form 
Charge.57  On the form, there are boxes where complainants can check the 
type of discrimination faced.  Complainants may check boxes for one or more 
protected classes and for retaliation.  There is no separate box for a plaintiff 
to check for harassment. Complainants are also asked to provide the dates of 
the alleged misconduct. 
In most cases, if a plaintiff (1) alleges sex discrimination, (2) claims 
that her sex negatively impacted the terms or conditions of her employment, 
and (3) notes the appropriate date range in her Charge, she should be allowed 
to later raise sexual harassment facts, even without mentioning harassment 
specifically.  In most cases, the facts supporting the harassment are 
reasonably related to the stated allegations because all of the facts are part of 
the same claim: the one claim for discrimination. 
Likewise, the plaintiff would only need to submit a complaint 
asserting a violation of Title VII, without any specific reference to 
harassment.  The plaintiff’s complaint would then need to contain facts to 
provide notice to the defendant that the plaintiff could establish the broader 
contours of Title VII.  If the plaintiff wants to have her facts analyzed under 
the harassment rubric, she could provide facts to support such a theory in her 
complaint, but she would not be required to do so.  As long as the plaintiff 
could prevail under any framework cognizable under Title VII, her claim 
should be allowed to proceed upon a challenge under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  As discussed in the following section, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that a plaintiff need not select at the pleading stage the 
particular theory upon which she will later proceed.58 
Additionally, as long as the plaintiff properly responds to discovery 
requests about alleged harassment, the plaintiff should be allowed to assert 
harassment facts at the summary judgment and trial phases, without 
separately pleading harassment in the complaint.59  Again, the idea is that 
harassment is not a separate claim with separate elements, but rather part of 
the broader concept of discrimination under Title VII. 
                                               
 57. Note that the EEOC “Charge of Discrimination” form contains no mention of the 
word “harassment,” and harassment is not listed on the form as a separate type of 
discrimination. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM., EEOC FORM 5:  CHARGE OF DISCRIMIN
ATION (2009), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/forms/upload/form_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V8R9-UNRJ]. 
 58. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002). 
 59. Scholarship supports the proposition that the discovery phase, rather than the 
complaint and motion-to-dismiss phase, performs a more central function in litigation, 
especially when complex arguments are presented with various theories and factual scenarios 
that require additional fact-finding. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky Arguments in Social-
Justice Litigation: The Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage Equality, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2087, 2101 n.39 (2014) (“Complaints often present a reduced version of a complex 
argument . . . [and] provide a framework for discovery. After the motion-to-dismiss phase . . . 
, the complaint is typically no longer the centerpiece of the litigation; focus turns instead to 
evidence gained through discovery and to the lawyers’ briefs and elaborated arguments in 
subsequent motions.”). 
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B. Substantive and Theoretical Issues 
Outside of the procedural context, the differences between 
harassment as part of Title VII, and harassment as a stand-alone claim, have 
enormous substantive and theoretical consequences. 
1. Separating Theories of Discrimination and Worker Choice 
Professor Laura Kessler has urged courts and scholars to consider 
the interplay between bias, structural discrimination, and worker choice in 
producing unequal outcomes in the workplace.60  In her article, Employment 
Discrimination and the Domino Effect, she presents a lengthy hypothetical 
about a female professor who is granted tenure, but who does not apply for 
full professor.61  The hypothetical begins with the junior professor avoiding 
an important male colleague in her department after he invited her to dinner 
while emphasizing that his wife was out of town.  The same male professor 
also places his hands on her shoulder while they stand in the buffet line at a 
weekly faculty lunch.  Although it is unclear whether this conduct would 
meet the “severe or pervasive” standard under Title VII, Professor Kessler 
argues that the combined effect of this early behavior with later incidents of 
bias, structural barriers, and employee choice yield unequal outcomes 
between the female professor and male colleagues with respect to promotion 
to full professor. 
At the same time, Professor Kessler notes that courts have been 
reluctant to allow plaintiffs to combine harassment claims based on 
sexualized conduct with other kinds of disparate treatment.62  For example, 
in the prior hypothetical, imagine that the male colleague’s unwarranted 
dinner invitation and touching at the buffet line causes the female professor 
to avoid that faculty member, who is an important person in her field.  
Imagine that when she applied for tenure, another male colleague peer-
reviewed her teaching and noted that “she seemed distracted because she 
must be spending too much time caring for her newborn baby.”  This negative 
evaluation went into her file.  Even though the professor received tenure, she 
was rated as “good,” rather than “excellent.” 
If we assume that harassment is a different claim from disparate 
treatment (as courts often do), the court will separately analyze the dinner 
invitation and buffet-line touching from the negative evaluation. It is unlikely 
that the dinner invitation and buffet-line massages will meet the severe or 
pervasive requirement, and so the court will dismiss that “claim.”  The court 
may even forbid the plaintiff from raising any evidence related to this 
conduct in support of her case.  Even though this early conduct relates to the 
later negative outcome, categorizing harassment as a stand-alone claim may 
                                               
 60. Kessler, supra note 47, at 1050. 
 61. Id. at 1060–65. 
 62. Id. at 1066. 
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cause the courts to disallow the plaintiff from connecting the harassing 
behavior with the plaintiff’s failure to become a full professor. 
Shortly after the Supreme Court recognized harassment, Professor 
Vicki Schultz showed how courts had difficulty recognizing non-sexualized 
harassment as a cognizable harm.63  Professor Schultz also noted how courts 
had difficulty recognizing a unified claim against the employer when a 
plaintiff alleged that one person engaged in sexual conduct toward her, while 
another person engaged in non-sexual harassment.64  In addition, she 
discussed how courts tended to evaluate non-sexual acts and comments under 
the rubric of disparate treatment, while evaluating sexual speech and 
comments under the harassment frame.65 
Professors Schultz and Kessler correctly describe and theorize many 
of the problems with how the courts conceive of harassment.  This Article 
asserts that some of these problems derive from a procedural ambiguity: 
viewing harassment as a separate, stand-alone claim.  As discussed in more 
detail throughout this Article, if one views Title VII as the claim itself (rather 
than harassment), there is more flexibility for the cause of action to be 
provable under different theories and evidentiary patterns, especially as we 
gain a better understanding of how and why inequality exists in the 
workplace.  Moreover, there is greater flexibility for judges and juries to find 
that new types of factual scenarios viably establish that a person faced 
discrimination on the basis of a protected trait.  The choice of civil-procedure 
language about what constitutes a claim, and what does not, has enormous 
impacts on the substantive and theoretical framing of cases involving 
harassment. 
2. Slicing and Dicing Within the Harassment Paradigm 
Under Title VII jurisprudence, the courts recognize different factual 
scenarios that will lead to liability under the general rubric of harassment, 
including “quid pro quo,” harassing conduct that culminates in an adverse 
action, and harassing conduct that does not result in an adverse action.66  As 
discussed in the cases below, some courts appear to view each of these as a 
separate “claim” with “separate elements.” 
One of the substantive consequences that may result from seeing 
these factual scenarios as separate “claims” is the phenomenon that the late 
                                               
 63. Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 1, at 1689; see also 
Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22, 24 (2018) 
(discussing how the #MeToo movement also often focuses on sexualized harassment). 
 64. Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 1, at 1701–05. 
 65. Id. at 1714. 
 66. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–54 (1998); Bowman 
v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 461 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000). Courts have been inconsistent 
in their use of the words “tangible employment action” and adverse action in describing the 
required “elements” for harassment that culminates in an adverse action. 
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Professor Michael Zimmer calls “slicing and dicing.”67  When a judge slices 
and dices the facts of a case, the judge subdivides the evidence into multiple 
claims and only considers the evidence for each claim in isolation, failing to 
put the evidence together to tell a more complete story about what is actually 
happening in the workplace. 
In some instances, the slicing and dicing causes alleged 
discriminatory acts to disappear.  Take the following example.  In one case, 
a plaintiff alleged that a supervisor harassed him because of his sex, and that 
the supervisor temporarily reassigned him to another position as part of the 
harassment.68  A court might view this as a claim for harassing conduct that 
culminates in an adverse action.69  However, the court might find as a matter 
of law that removing the plaintiff from a job temporarily does not meet the 
adverse action requirement because it is temporary.  The court might then 
dismiss the “claim” for harassment that culminates in an adverse action. 
Given the lack of an adverse action, the court may then consider 
whether the plaintiff has a “claim” for harassment that does not result in an 
adverse action.70  The court will consider whether the conduct is “severe or 
pervasive.”71  In doing so, it will omit the temporary loss of the position from 
the list of items that support the plaintiff’s allegations that he faced severe or 
pervasive conduct.  This allegation simply disappears from the second 
“claim” because the court does not view it as an adverse action and does not 
otherwise view it as harassment. 
In other cases, the court may refuse to draw causal connections 
between events and outcomes that the court considers to fall within different 
“causes of action.”  For example, in one case a woman alleged that her 
supervisor repeatedly insinuated that her tenure and advancement with a 
company would be enhanced if she engaged in a sexual relationship with 
him.  The woman claimed the following: 
[The plaintiff] asserts that, after she was hired, [the 
supervisor] persistently showed her an unusual amount of 
attention of a sexual nature, including frequently staring at 
her breasts, genitals, and legs while praising her 
“performance” and offering her raises. She alleges that [he] 
also engaged in numerous unwelcome sexual advances, 
including, on one occasion, rubbing her neck and shoulders 
and resting the heel of his hands on her shoulders with his 
fingertips just above the tops of her breasts; asking her if she 
had watched a James Bond movie involving a secretary 
                                               
 67. Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 
LA. L. REV. 577, 584 (2001). 
 68. For a case with similar allegations, see generally Bowman, 220 F.3d at 461. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 462. 
 71. Id. 
2019] HARASSMENT:  A SEPARATE CLAIM? 135 
named Money Penny who had a sexual relationship with her 
boss; offering her raises and other benefits, including 
overtime pay, company day care, and travel, at the same time 
asking her to meet him privately and socially after regular 
working hours or in his office on the weekends for drinks; 
“stalking” or following her around Fort Dodge; and showing 
inappropriate attention to or asking inappropriate questions 
about her personal and social life, including whether she had 
a boyfriend who would be angry if she met [him] after 
work.72 
This worker alleged that because of this conduct, she (1) avoided 
taking overtime opportunities where fewer people would be in the office, (2) 
avoided the supervisor at work, and (3) eventually took a medical leave due 
to emotional distress.73  The total time span of the alleged conduct, including 
the medical leave, was little more than a year.74  The company disputed many 
of the allegations. 
In ruling on summary judgment in this case, the court held that all of 
these allegations were relevant to a hostile environment claim; however, the 
court found them to be too remote in time to be relevant to a constructive 
discharge claim.75  The plaintiff’s case was allowed to proceed; however, the 
court held there was no constructive discharge.76  The court perceived 
“hostile work environment,” “quid pro quo,” and the constructive discharge 
to be three separate claims that each required different sets of evidence.77 
Conceptual problems also arise when a plaintiff alleges harassing 
conduct, but the court does not believe that the conduct rises to the level of a 
request for sexual favors.  Imagine a case in which a worker alleges that her 
supervisor did the following: 
She testifies that she told [him] not to touch her after he 
touched her on the shoulder down the middle of her back. 
This is the only instance of physical conduct alleged and the 
only instance she allegedly acknowledged his “advances.” 
She states that [the supervisor] called her pretty, said she had 
a girly body, wore sexy jeans, alluded that she smelled like 
soap, alluded that she might gain weight, commented that 
                                               
 72. EEOC v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. C 00-3079-MWB, 2001 WL 34008505, at 
*2 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 21, 2001). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at *11. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at *1, *11. 
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[she] walked passed without speaking, and stared at her. 
[She] states she ignored his comments and staring.78 
The plaintiff then alleged that she was falsely accused of 
insubordination and the company fired her.79  The company contested the 
plaintiff’s allegations and evidence supporting the allegations.80 
In this case, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s “quid pro quo” claim 
because it found that the plaintiff could not establish that the supervisor’s 
behavior amounted to a request for sexual favors.81  Thus, the court 
recognized “quid pro quo” as a separate “claim” from “hostile work 
environment” that required the plaintiff to establish a separate set of elements 
to proceed.  What is odd is that a court would be comfortable in making these 
kinds of value-based judgments about the intended effect of the behavior.  
The Court did not view the comments about the women’s body or the looks 
as part of a possible quid pro quo.  Viewing “quid pro quo” as a separate 
“claim” with certain required elements (i.e., a request for sexual favors) 
invites this kind of inquiry. 
However, it should be noted that this state of affairs is not dictated 
by the text of Title VII, but rather how the courts have inartfully divided 
harassment into separate “claims.”  The question Title VII asks is whether a 
plaintiff faced a different outcome because of her sex or other protected trait. 
The text clearly allows the woman to combine instances of harassment from 
seemingly separate instances of disparate treatment.  These are not separate 
“claims,” under Title VII’s text.  And, the text of Title VII places liability at 
the employer, and not the individual, level.82  There is no textual barrier to 
aggregating all actions that occur under one employer within the time frames 
allowed for bringing claims under the statute.83 
Thinking about Title VII as a general cause of action may induce 
both judges and factfinders to view the facts more holistically because they 
are not looking at the evidence through narrow silos, but rather through the 
broader lens of the statutory language of Title VII. 
3. Damages 
The court’s use of the term “claim” also has important implications 
for damages.  Courts recognize that harassing conduct can culminate in an 
                                               
 78. Gilliam v. Berkeley Contract Packaging, LLC, No. 12-cv-1174-DRH-SCW, 2014 
WL 2927023, at *5 (S.D. Ill. June 27, 2014). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at *2. 
 81. Id. at *5. 
 82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2012). 
 83. Work is needed to reconcile this underlying set of facts and issues of employer 
liability. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
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adverse action.84  For example, imagine a plaintiff has a supervisor who uses 
highly derogatory language on four occasions over a year stating that women 
would not make good managers.  The plaintiff is qualified for a managerial 
position and applies for the job, but the supervisor chooses a less qualified 
male candidate for the manager position. 
In such a case, the woman faces harm over the year-long period in 
which her supervisor makes these comments.  She faces uncertainty about 
whether the supervisor will judge her fairly in any future decisions.  She faces 
the dilemma of whether to complain about the comments and possibly face 
workplace retaliation for the report.  Given the current state of retaliation law, 
if she complains too early, she may not be protected against retaliation.85 
Now imagine a second case.  A supervisor does not make any of the 
comments to the plaintiff. Instead, at the time of promotion, he simply hires 
a less qualified male candidate over the plaintiff.  There is evidence he did 
not hire the plaintiff because of her sex, but the plaintiff does not know about 
it until after the supervisor makes the promotion decision. 
In both cases, a woman faced discrimination because of a protected 
trait.  Let’s assume that both women suffered the same amount of emotional 
distress from the failure to promote.  However, a question arises about 
whether the plaintiff in the first case could seek damages for the comments 
made before the promotion decision, if she could establish that the comments 
caused her emotional distress.  It seems that the answer should be yes, given 
that the harassing comments and the failure to promote both harmed the 
plaintiff, and taken together, they meet Title VII’s threshold for harm to the 
“terms, conditions, or privileges of [the plaintiff’s] employment.” 
Yet, such an outcome appears to be at odds with the idea that 
harassment is a separate claim. Indeed in Ellerth, the Supreme Court noted: 
When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action 
resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual 
demands, he or she establishes that the employment decision 
itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of 
employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any 
sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be 
actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or 
pervasive. Because Ellerth’s claim involves only unfulfilled 
threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work 
environment claim which requires a showing of severe or 
pervasive conduct.86 
                                               
 84. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (listing examples of materially adverse actions). 
 85. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 78–79 (2005). 
 86. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753–54 (1998); see also Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, No. 
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Viewing harassment as a claim (or set of claims) with separate 
elements that is distinct from other claims under Title VII contributes to 
numerous problems.  It creates unnecessary procedural hurdles to harassment 
and creates questions about damages.87  It makes it more likely that courts 
will disaggregate harassment from other discrimination facts.88  Courts may 
even disaggregate different kinds of harassment from one another, carefully 
slicing the “claims” of “quid pro quo,” “hostile environment” that culminates 
in an adverse action, and hostile environment that does not culminate in an 
adverse action.  Courts may also separate the actions of different actors, 
separating the harassing conduct of some actors from the otherwise 
discriminatory conduct of others.  Further, courts may separate all of this 
conduct from other dynamics that create inequality, like structural 
discrimination. 
III. PROCEDURAL AMBIGUITY 
If viewing harassment as a claim distorts discrimination law, it is 
worth considering whether harassment is a stand-alone claim.  For the past 
several decades, the Supreme Court has been adjudicating procedurally 
ambiguous cases and then resolving those procedural ambiguities in ways 
that contest the dominant procedural paradigm being used at the time by the 
lower courts.  The procedural ambiguity that we see in harassment cases is 
part of a broader jurisprudential picture.  Consistent with this broader picture, 
it is likely that the dominant paradigm is both unintentional and can easily be 
changed or clarified. 
The most prominent example of this happened in Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N. A.89  In that case, the Supreme Court addressed similar (although 
not identical) confusion about what constitutes a “claim” under Title VII.  In 
Swierkiewicz,90 the Supreme Court considered whether a court may dismiss 
a plaintiff’s complaint if the plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to support 
each of the factors of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.91 
In 1973, the Supreme Court first developed a test called McDonnell 
Douglas that courts use to analyze some (but not all) individual disparate 
treatment discrimination cases.92  The test begins with a multi-part first step, 
called the prima facie case.  In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff can establish the prima facie case by 
showing the following: 
                                               
plaintiff must separately establish the severe or pervasive element for pre-termination 
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 87. See discussion supra Sections II.B.2–3. 
 88. See discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
 89. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002). 
 90. Id. 
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 92. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
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(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied 
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he 
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.93 
The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that the facts required to 
establish a prima facie case will necessarily vary, depending on the factual 
scenario of the underlying case.94  The Supreme Court has stated on 
numerous occasions that the prima facie case is not supposed to be onerous.95 
After the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, a rebuttable 
presumption of discrimination arises.96  The analysis then proceeds to the 
second step of McDonnell Douglas.  After a plaintiff makes a prima facie 
showing, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory 
decision or action, thereby rebutting the presumption.97  In the third step, the 
plaintiff is then provided the opportunity to show that the employer’s stated 
reason for the employment action was pretext, or other evidence that shows 
that the employee’s protected trait played a role in the outcome.98 
In Swierkiewicz, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit treated the McDonnell Douglas test as if the test comprised elements 
of a claim.99  The idea that McDonnell Douglas states the elements of a claim 
was infused throughout the jurisprudence at this time.100  From that 
assumption, the Second Circuit found it proper to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim 
based on a failure to plead and properly support those elements.101 
However, the Supreme Court held that the McDonnell Douglas 
prima facie case does not represent the elements of a Title VII claim.102 
Instead, it explained: 
The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, however, 
is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. 
In McDonnell Douglas, this Court made clear that “[t]he 
critical issue before us concern[ed] the order and 
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 94. Id. at 802–03. 
 95. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015); Tex. 
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allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging 
employment discrimination.” In subsequent cases, this Court 
has reiterated that the prima facie case relates to the 
employee’s burden of presenting evidence that raises an 
inference of discrimination. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (“In [McDonnell 
Douglas,] we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and 
order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging 
discriminatory treatment.)103 
Swierkiewicz demonstrates that even though courts describe an 
analytical structure as a claim and treat it as a claim for decades, the then-
existing structure may not represent a claim at all.  As the Court noted in 
Swierkiewicz, there are many ways for a plaintiff to prove that he faced 
discrimination under Title VII.  One of those ways is through the McDonnell 
Douglas framework.  However, the plaintiff can prevail through different 
iterations of McDonnell Douglas and the plaintiff can also prevail without 
proceeding through McDonnell Douglas at all.104  Additionally, the plaintiff 
is not required to choose whether to use McDonnell Douglas at the pleading 
stage, but can wait to choose her proof structure until she obtains discovery, 
as long as she presents sufficient facts to support a Title VII claim.105 
This same problem with characterizing a proof structure too strictly 
also has occurred at the circuit-court level.  In Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, 
Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff may prevail on a discrimination 
claim through either a direct method or an indirect method.106  The Court 
further held that a plaintiff could prevail under the direct method by showing 
a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence.  However, the Seventh 
Circuit recently retracted the convincing mosaic framework, in part, because 
judges were improperly transforming the convincing mosaic framework into 
required elements of a “claim.”107  As the Seventh Circuit noted, “The district 
court treated each method as having its own elements and rules, even though 
we have held that they are just means to consider whether one fact (here, 
ethnicity) caused another (here, discharge) and therefore are not ‘elements’ 
of any claim.”108 
The Seventh Circuit also noted that even though it had tried to warn 
courts not to treat the convincing mosaic test as the “elements” of a “claim,” 
its admonitions did not work.109  Importantly, the Seventh Circuit itself 
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lapsed into language that categorized the convincing mosaic framework as a 
legal requirement.110  The Seventh Circuit noted: 
Today we reiterate that “convincing mosaic” is not a legal 
test. We overrule the opinions in the previous paragraph to 
the extent that they rely on “convincing mosaic” as a 
governing legal standard. We do not hold that any of those 
cases was wrongly decided; our concern is only with the 
treatment of “convincing mosaic” as if it were a legal 
requirement. From now on, any decision of a district court 
that treats this phrase as a legal requirement in an 
employment-discrimination case is subject to summary 
reversal, so that the district court can evaluate the evidence 
under the correct standard. 
That legal standard, to repeat what we wrote in Achor and 
many later cases, is simply whether the evidence would 
permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s 
race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor 
caused the discharge or other adverse employment action. 
Evidence must be considered as a whole, rather than asking 
whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by 
itself—or whether just the “direct” evidence does so, or the 
“indirect” evidence. Evidence is evidence. Relevant 
evidence must be considered and irrelevant evidence 
disregarded, but no evidence should be treated differently 
from other evidence because it can be labeled “direct” or 
“indirect.”111 
Like Swierkiewicz, Ortiz demonstrates that courts often use language 
that suggests an employment discrimination test or analytical structure 
represents the “elements” of a “claim,” when this is not accurate.  Ortiz 
emphasizes that the cause of action is a Title VII claim and that all evidence 
of discrimination should be considered together.112 
Another Supreme Court case, University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center v. Nassar, offers an additional example of procedural 
ambiguity.113  In the 1989 case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme 
Court interpreted Title VII as allowing a plaintiff to prevail by establishing 
that a protected trait operated as a motivating factor in an employment 
outcome.114 
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In 1991, Congress amended Title VII115 by adding § 2000e–2(m) to 
the statute.  That section provides that a plaintiff may prevail under Title VII 
by establishing that a protected trait was a motivating factor in an 
employment decision.116  Congress also created an affirmative defense, 
which, if proven, would be a partial defense to damages.117 
Even though the text of Title VII did not use the terms “mixed-
motive,” courts began referring to § 2000e–2(m) as establishing a “mixed-
motive” claim.118  Some courts distinguished these “mixed-motive” claims 
from what the courts called the “single-motive” claim provided under the 
statute’s main language in § 2000e–2(a). 
In Nassar, the Supreme Court held the following:  “For one thing, 
§ 2000e–2(m) is not itself a substantive bar on discrimination. Rather, it is a 
rule that establishes the causation standard for proving a violation defined 
elsewhere in Title VII.”119  Nassar clarified that the underlying claim was a 
violation of Title VII.120  A plaintiff may prove that claim through many 
different paths.121  The plaintiff can use McDonnell Douglas prima facie 
test.122  The plaintiff can also use the causation language found in § 2000e–
2(m).123 
Similarly, the courts have been inaccurate when they use other civil-
procedure language, such as language related to burdens of production and 
burdens of persuasion.124  For example, there have been decades of confusion 
about how the burdens of production and persuasion work at each step in the 
McDonnell Douglas test. 125 
As these cases show, the courts have, for decades, regularly and 
incorrectly, used terms like “claim” and “element.”  A later case may then 
radically change the legal landscape by rejecting the idea that a particular test 
represents the elements of a claim. 
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IV. HARASSMENT AS FACTS SUPPORTING A TITLE VII CLAIM 
The prior section shows that the Supreme Court often interprets Title 
VII in procedurally ambiguous ways.  The lower courts often respond to this 
procedural ambiguity by choosing one of the possible routes.  At times, the 
Supreme Court has returned to the procedural ambiguity and resolved it in 
ways that upset the dominant paradigm. 
In some instances, the courts’ ambiguous language relates to whether 
certain facts constitute a “cause of action” with required “elements.”  The 
Supreme Court has twice demolished the dominant procedural paradigm 
created by the inexact language surrounding “claim” and “element.”  The 
Supreme Court (in Swierkiewicz and Nassar) and the Seventh Circuit in 
Ortiz, both emphasized that the overall claim is a Title VII claim, and a 
plaintiff may prove that claim using different procedural methods and 
evidentiary paths. 
Applying these lessons in the context of Title VII provides a roadmap 
for convincing courts that the current dynamic of treating harassment as a 
separate claim is incorrect.  As discussed earlier, it is not clear that the 
Supreme Court meant to crystallize harassment as a separate claim.  
Although it used some “claim” language, it has also repeatedly emphasized 
that harassment is part of a larger Title VII claim. 
Rather than thinking about harassment as a separate claim, it is more 
accurate to state that in Meritor and Harris, the Supreme Court was merely 
offering examples of some types of conduct that would satisfy (a)(1)’s 
language that the unlawful employment practice affects the “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.”126  When doing so, the Court did 
not provide a complete list of all of the factual situations that would reach 
such a level.127  Nor did it say that harassing acts and other discriminatory 
acts were separate and could not be considered together when thinking about 
whether the plaintiff could cross the required harm threshold.128 
Thinking about harassment in this way can clarify many of the 
procedural issues discussed in Section III.  Title VII is the claim. Plaintiff is 
not required to separately plead a count or a claim called “harassment,” 
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although the plaintiff may do so, if she chooses.129  As long as the plaintiff 
has given appropriate notice in the complaint and properly responded to 
discovery, the plaintiff may prevail on any set of facts that establishes 
liability under Title VII.130 
A plaintiff should be able to aggregate all harms that occur with the 
same employer to meet Title VII’s required harm threshold, whether they are 
perpetrated by one individual, a small group of connected individuals, or a 
group of unconnected individuals.131  The plaintiff can also show how 
policies and structures impacted employment.  The key question under 
section (a)(1) is whether the plaintiff faced certain negative employment 
outcomes or was “otherwise . . . discriminate[d] against . . . with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]”132  Title 
VII focuses liability at the employer level.133 
By thinking of harassment in this way, we can open up section (a)(2) 
as an option for exploring it . Courts often narrow harassment by focusing on 
a single victim and a single perpetrator or small group of perpetrators.  In her 
recent essay, Professor Tristin K.  Green ponders whether recognizing sexual 
harassment as a separate form of discrimination is a mistake.134  Professor 
Green argues, 
Sexual harassment is a form of discrimination because more 
often than not it is tied to broader inequality in the 
workplace. But our law has not embraced this reality. 
Instead, the existing law of harassment constrains 
permissible narratives on both sides. On the victim side, it 
rewards thinking of ourselves and our experiences of 
harassment in isolation, when we might instead see our 
experiences as members of groups embedded within broader 
environments. On the perpetrator side, it asks whether a 
specific, identified harasser engaged in acts of harassment, 
thereby ignoring others in the organization and the 
organizational structure itself as causes of ongoing hostile 
environments.135 
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Professor Green properly criticizes the Supreme Court’s test as 
focusing too much on identifying conduct directed at an individual and for 
preventing plaintiffs from pursuing “a collective claim, and thereby more 
easily present[ing] a collective story.”136 
While this individualized focus is embedded in the contemporary 
harassment doctrine, it need not be so if courts and litigants can reframe 
harassment as one type of harm that is connected to other types of harmful 
discrimination.  The language of Title VII’s second operative provision 
provides for a more expansive view of harassing behavior.  That language 
makes it unlawful for an employer: 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.137 
To date, the courts have not considered what harassment might look 
like under section (a)(2).  They have framed harassment as a “claim” that is 
derivative of section (a)(1).138  However, by viewing harassment as being a 
theory of harm under the larger umbrella of Title VII, it becomes clearer that 
harassment litigants can argue for broader conceptions of discrimination 
under section (a)(2). 
For example, the provision in section (a)(2) prevents employment 
practices that “deprive or tend to deprive” a person of employment 
opportunities or “otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.”139  
This language does not rely on the “terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment language.”140  In the prior hypothetical involving the female 
professor, the professor should be able to argue that her employment 
opportunities were “adversely affect[ed]” by her colleagues’ actions. 
Additionally, because the language includes practices that “tend to 
deprive”141 an employee of opportunities, people should be able to pull 
together the collective experience of other employees in the protected class 
and demonstrate how those experiences affected the plaintiff.  For example, 
if women in a department are routinely harassed and passed over for 
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promotion, a plaintiff might be able to establish that her chance to be 
promoted is affected by this environment, even if she is not a direct target of 
harassment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Courts often characterize harassment as a separate claim with a 
separate set of elements. This frame brings with it a number of procedural, 
substantive, and theoretical consequences. 
As this Article shows, it is more likely that when courts speak about 
harassment as a “claim,” they are not overtly grappling with the 
consequences that derive from this framing.  As with other cases in the past, 
it is likely that the Supreme Court’s early use of “claim” language was simply 
inaccurate.  Although this language has come to have a host of collateral 
effects, it is not too late to correct the framing problem.  Following the model 
in Swierkiewicz and Nassar, the Supreme Court or lower courts can unwind 
the damage done by this inartful use of civil-procedure language and 
empower future plaintiffs to plead harassment within the larger ambit of Title 
VII. 
